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Abstract
We study a strategic market game associated to an intertemporal economy with a ﬁnite hori-
zon and incomplete markets. We demonstrate that generically, for any ﬁnite number of players,
every sequentially strictly individually rational and default-free stream of allocations can be
approximated by a full subgame-perfect equilibrium. As a consequence, imperfect competition
may Pareto-dominate perfect competition when markets are incomplete. Moreover — and this
contrasts with the main message conveyed by the market games literature — there exists a large
open set of initial endowments for which full subgame-perfect equilibria do not converge to η-
eﬃcient allocations when the number of players tends to inﬁnity. Finally, strategic speculative
bubbles may survive at full subgame-perfect equilibria.
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It is widely acknowledged that a sensible model of resource allocation, over time and with uncer-
tainty, must include two components: (1) commodities that are allocated on a system of sequential
spot markets, and (2) a sequential system of incomplete ﬁnancial markets through which income
is redistributed among investors. The general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI)
oﬀers a convenient framework for the analysis of the main issues at hand: existence and multiplicity
of equilibria, eﬃciency, persistence of speculative bubbles, and impact of market incompleteness
on welfare, prices, and consumption.1 However, this model neglects the fact that prices should be
derived endogenously from the strategic interaction of investors. To take account of this requires a
more detailed modeling of the way in which transactions occur.
There is now an extensive literature on strategic market games whose equilibria provide a rig-
orous foundation for the “invisible hand” (see Dubey (1994) for a survey). Prominent in this
approach is the strategic market game model (see Shapley & Shubik (1977), Postelwaite & Schmei-
dler (1978)); here agents are assumed to send quantity-setting strategies to trading posts, where
prices form so as to equalize supply and demand on each market.
In such models, phenomena related to imperfect competition are known to prevail: strategic
equilibria are typically ineﬃcient (Dubey & Rogawski (1990)), arbitrage opportunities may occur at
equilibrium (Koutsougeras (2000)), the market structure matters (Weyers (1999)), and sunspots are
compatible with the completeness of markets (Peck & Shell (1991)). Nevertheless, in the absence
of uncertainty and as the number of players grows to inﬁnity, “nice” or “full” Nash equilibria
a r ek n o w nt oc o n v e r g et o( a l m o s t )e ﬃcient allocations (Dubey & Shubik (1978), Postlewaite &
Schmeidler (1978)). This enables us to consider the invisible hand as a limit case of imperfect
competition. To date, however, there is no extension of the basic strategic market game to an
1See Magill & Quinzii (1996) for an extensive account of these various topics.
1intertemporal economy with ﬁnitely many players and intrinsic uncertainty.
The main aim of the present paper is to start ﬁlling this gap. We construct a strategic market
game with ﬁat money, that is associated to a ﬁnite-horizon economy with incomplete markets. Our
main assumption is that there is nontrivial monitoring as the game unfolds: players can condition
their present actions on the prices previously prevailing in the economy. However, players do not
observe details of the transactions or how the prices are formed. The assets in our model are
long-lived nominal securities. These securities yield dividends over two or more periods and can
be retraded at each date after their issue. Traders are concerned with future resale values of the
security in addition to its dividend streams, unlike the case with short-lived securities.2
Our results are threefold and bring good and bad news both. The ﬁrst result is that, generically,
all the “default-free” and “sequentially strictly individually rational” allocations can be approxi-
mated arbitrarily closely by “full” subgame-perfect equilibria. Clearly, this result is akin to a
perfect Folk theorem with imperfect monitoring, and we will show how it diﬀers from a simple
application of already known results. The terms in quotation marks will be deﬁned with care in
the body of the paper. For the moment, it suﬃces to note that this result implies that a nonempty
subset of constrained (second-best) eﬃcient allocations can be approximated by means of strategic
equilibria.3
By contrast, it is well known that, generically, every competitive equilibrium of such a ﬁnite-
horizon GEI economy is not second-best eﬃcient (Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis (1986), Citanna,
Kajii & Villanacci (1998)).4 As a result, imperfect competition under certain circumstances may
2These yield a positive dividend for only one period after they are issued. Hence they can only be traded once.
3An allocation is constrained eﬃcient if it is eﬃcient given the incompleteness of the asset markets, as in Geanako-
plos & Polemarchakis (1986).
4In fact, the cited papers prove the generic constrained ineﬃciency of competitive equilibria for numeraire assets,
not for purely ﬁnancial ones. However, it is well known that ﬁxing the price level of commodities in each state is
equivalent to transforming ﬁnancial securities into real assets that deliver a numeraire commodity in each state (see,
e.g., Geanakoplos & Mas-Colell (1989)). Hence, the negative results proven in these other papers are easily imported
into our framework.
2yield subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations that Pareto-dominate the competitive equilibria of
the corresponding GEI economy.
One by-product of our ﬁrst result is an existence proof for full subgame-perfect equilibria for
ﬁnite-horizon economies with incomplete markets. Regarding the notion of genericity used in this
paper, let us specify that by “generic” we mean “for a dense and open subset of initial endowments,
and given any ﬁxed asset return structure”. This is less demanding than many existence results for
competitive equilibria in GEI economies (see, e.g., Duﬃe & Shafer (1985)), which are stated for a
generic set of asset return structures in addition to initial endowments.
Our second result concerns the relationship between strategic market games and their com-
petitive counterpart. Postlewaite & Schmeidler (1978) examine this question for the static game
with ﬁat money and show that, for any η > 0, the “full” Nash equilibria5 converge to η-eﬃcient
allocations of the underlying economy as the number of agents grows to inﬁnity. The intuitively
appealing analogue of this convergence result in our context would be that “full” subgame-perfect
equilibria converge to η-eﬃcient allocations as the number of players tends to inﬁnity. Roughly
speaking, we show that this convergence fails if the horizon is long enough compared to the num-
ber of agents,6 players are suﬃciently patient, and initial endowments are not already η-eﬃcient.
More precisely: even when markets are complete, there exists a nonempty and open subset of the
set of feasible allocations that (a) can be approximated by “full” subgame-perfect equilibria and
(b) do not converge to an η-eﬃcient allocation as individual market power vanishes — provided
endowments belong to an open subset not contained in the closure of the η-eﬃcient allocations (see
Theorem 2).
Our third result concerns the link between the fundamental value of an asset and its price. In a
5Loosely speaking, these are equilibria at which all trading posts are open and active.
6Of course, this needs to be made precise. Indeed, two simultaneous limits are taken (with respect to the number
of agents and the horizon), and the order in which they are taken matters. For the indeterminacy result obtained in
this paper, the horizon tends to inﬁnity ﬁrst. See Section 6 for more on this issue.
3perfectly competitive ﬁnite-horizon economy, the fundamental value of ﬁnancial contracts (i.e., the
discounted value of their dividend stream) is always equal, at equilibrium, to their exchange price,
so that speculative bubbles cannot arise.7 We show by means of an example that, in our ﬁnite-
horizon model with strategic investors, the price of a security may be diﬀerent from its fundamental
value — even if asset markets are complete, and regardless of the (ﬁnite) number of agents.
Though the main result of this paper looks like a Folk theorem, we stress that it does not follow
from usual Folk theorems. There are several reasons for this. First, the intertemporal market game
we are analyzing is not a repeated game. Wealth can be transmitted across periods and states of
Nature (through ﬁnancial securities), so that a player’s action at a given date inﬂuences not only
his current payoﬀ but also the set of future available actions. Hence, the game we study is formally
a stochastic game with a continuum of actions at each date, a continuum of transition states, and
incomplete (but symmetric) information. To the best of our knowledge, nothing like a perfect Folk
theorem is available for games of this type.
Second, even if there were no assets to trade in any period, our game would still not be a repeated
game because the underlying economy is not assumed to be stationary. This is the second reason
why our results cannot be deduced from standard ones. As a consequence, we do not compare
the strategic outcomes of our intertemporal game with outcomes of any one-shot game (as is done
for Folk theorems) but rather with a subset of the feasible allocations of the whole intertemporal
economy.
Third, our horizon is ﬁn i t ea n dt h et e r m i n a ld a t ec a nb ea s s u m e dt ob ec o m m o nk n o w l e d g e . 8
Even in proper repeated games, this feature is known to induce some interiority restrictions9 in
7See Magill & Quinzii (1996, section 21) for a proof.
8Recall from Neyman (1999) that even an exponentially small departure from common knowledge on the number
of repetitions of a one-shot game enables the approximation of any feasible and individually rational outcome of that
game by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
9See Benoit & Krishna (1985) for details and the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma for a counterexample.
4order for anything akin to a perfect Folk theorem to hold. Thus, at the very least we show that
our intertemporal market game generically satisﬁes this kind of interiority restriction.
Finally, standard Folk theorems rely on the min-max point of each player as a threat in case a
deviation is observed. Our proof does not. Indeed, in a strategic market game, a trader’s min-max
point is no-trade and, by conﬁning ourselves to full subgame-perfect equilibria, we explicitly avoid
the no-trade equilibrium when constructing a punishing phase. Moreover, for the min-max threat
to have real bite, players must be able to identify the perpetrator of any detected deviation. This
is impossible in our model, as players observe only aggregate quantities.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the description of the model — that is,
the stochastic GEI economy and the game. Section 3 contains our ﬁrst theorem: for any number
of players and whenever endowments are not η-eﬃcient, all the “default-free” and “sequentially
individually rational” allocations can generically be sustained as full subgame-perfect equilibria.
Section 4 contains our second theorem; it states that, generically, “full” subgame-perfect equilibria
do not converge to η-eﬃcient allocations. The discussion of speculative bubbles follows in Section
5, and Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains all the proofs.
2 The Model
2.1 The Stochastic GEI Economy
We consider a class of pure exchange economies with ﬁnite horizon, ﬁnitely many uncertain states
of nature, and incomplete markets of purely ﬁnancial assets.
52.1.1 Time and Uncertainty
There are ﬁnitely many periods t =1 ,...,T. Information is revealed about the state of nature
during each period. The unfolding of information is captured by an increasing family of information
partitions F =( Ft)t,w h e r ee a c hFt is a partition of a ﬁnite set S of exogenous and uncertain states
of nature. As usual, we assume that no information is available at date t =1(i.e., F1 = {S})a n d
that all the uncertainty is resolved at the terminal date t = T (i.e., FT = S). For each date t and
each subset σ ∈ Ft, the pair ξ =( t,σ) is called a date-event or a node.
We denote by D the ﬁnite set of all date-events. A partial order ≥ is deﬁned on D by the
following relation: ξ =( t,σ) ≥ (>) ξ0 =( t0,σ0) i fa n do n l yi ft ≥ (>) t0 and σ ⊆ σ0. The pair
(D, ≥) is a tree, often denoted simply by D.T h er o o to fD is (1,S) and is denoted ξ0. A node
(T,σ) is called a terminal node, and the set of all terminal nodes is denoted by DT; the subset
of nonterminal nodes is written D−.E a c hn o d eξ =( t,σ) ∈ D− admits a ﬁnite set of immediate
successors:
ξ+ := {ξ0 ∈ D : ξ0 =( t +1 ,σ0), σ0 ⊆ σ}.
Each node ξ =( t,σ), distinct from the root, admits a single unique predecessor ξ− =( t − 1,σ0)
deﬁned by σ ⊆ σ0.L e tn denote the number of nodes in the tree, that is, n =# D.
For any node ξ, the set of all nodes ξ0 such that ξ0 ≥ ξ is denoted D(ξ) and constitutes a tree
with root ξ. Moreover, the set of all nodes ξ0 such that ξ0 > ξ is denoted D+(ξ);t h i si st h et r e e
D(ξ) without its root. Each node ξ corresponds to a ﬁnite history of exogenous events whose length
is denoted τ(ξ).T h u sτ(1,S)=1and τ(ξ−)=τ(ξ)−1.G i v e naﬁnite history ξ with τ(ξ) ≥ t ≥ 1,
write ξt for the history up to (and including) time t.
Denote by π(ξ) the probability that ξ is reached. We assume that π(ξ) > 0 for all ξ and that
P
ξ:τ(ξ)=t π(ξ)=1for all t with 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
62.1.2 Commodities
In each period t,w eh a v eL ≥ 1 perishable consumption commodities that can be traded on spot
markets. The space Ai of allocations for player i is the set of functions xi :D→ RL
+,s oAi =
(RL
+)n for all i =1 ,...,N.The initial endowment of each investor i i sg i v e nb ya ne l e m e n tωi À 0
of (RL
++)n, the space of initial holdings. Spot prices are functions p :D→ RL
+.
2.1.3 Securities
There is a ﬁnite set of J nominal securities that can be traded on ﬁnancial markets. Each asset
j =1 ,...,J is characterized by its issue node ξ(j) ∈ D−. The dividend at node ξ > ξ(j) is in units
of account at node ξ, and the dividend process is denoted V j : D+(ξ(j)) → R. This describes the
promised delivery of ﬁat money from security j at all nodes strictly succeeding its node of issue
ξ(j). By extension, let V j(ξ)=0if ξ / ∈ D+(ξ(j)). If ξ ∈ D+(ξ(j)), V j(ξ) 6=0 , and V j(ξ0)=0for
all ξ0 > ξ,t h e nξ is an expiration node of security j.
A ﬁnancial structure (ζ,V) for our economy is deﬁned by the vector ζ of nodes of issue for the
J contracts
ζ =( ξ(j),j=1 ,...,J)
and the family V =( V 1,...,VJ) of n-dimensional dividend vectors.
Let ϑi
j(ξ) denote the amount of j-securities held by agent i at a node ξ after all trading has




We write ϑi for the portfolio plan (ϑi(ξ))ξ∈D.
72.1.4 Agents and Utilities
There are N ≥ 2 agents trading assets and commodities. Traders maximize the discounted sum of
their expected utility. Speciﬁcally, for each t ≥ 1, there is a utility function ui
t(·):RL
+ → R.W e
make the following fairly standard smoothness assumptions:
(a) ui
t(·) is of class C2 on RL
++;
(b) the gradient Dui
t(·) veriﬁes Dui
t(·) À 0 on RL
++;
(c) the Hessian matrix D2ui
t(·) is negative deﬁnite on RL
++;a n d








++ for all c ∈ R.
For every t and for each node ξ =( t,σ) ∈D, let us denote by Eξ the L-good spot economy
populated by N agents and characterized by the utility functions ui
t(·) and the (certain) initial
endowments ωi
ξ. The discount factor for player i is given by λi ∈ (0,1). The total utility for the















We shall consider a class of economies like the one just deﬁned. The economies are denoted
E(T,λ,ω) and are parameterized by their length T, their discount factors λ =( λi)i,a n dt h e i r
stream of initial allocations ω =( ωi
ξ)i,ξ.10 We wish to vary the horizon T, so we consider economies
10Note that the dimension of ω (and of other allocations) depends on the number of periods T being considered
and the number N of players in the game. For ease of discourse we omit these parameters from the notation, as they
should be clear from the context.
8E(T,λ,ω) as truncations of an inﬁnite-horizon economy E∞(λ,ω).
We consider only economies E∞(λ,ω) that become stationary after some number of periods.
That is, we assume there exists some integer τ > 0 such that ui
t(·)=ui
t0(·) for all t,t0 ≥ τ.
Moreover, for every pair of nodes ξ =( t,σ) and ξ0 =( t0,σ0) ∈ D with t,t0 ≥ τ,w eh a v eωi
ξ = ωi
ξ0 for
every agent i. This simplifying assumption will prevent cumbersome situations in which individual
utilities may become increasingly ﬂat with time or in which initial endowments may “explode” with
time, so that any reward or punishment late enough in the time horizon would become ineﬀective.
Let BS(D) denote the set of initial allocations for E∞(λ,ω). By the stationarity assumption on
E∞(λ,ω), it follows that BS(D) is the set of bounded functions on D that become stationary after
time τ.
Given E∞(λ,ω), denote by E∞
T (λ,ω) the truncated economy of length T. This economy has the
same set of agents (with their discount factors and utility functions) as E∞(λ,ω) but is derived from
it by considering only its ﬁrst T periods; hence E(T,λ,ω)=E∞
T (λ,ω). Similarly, if Ω is some subset
of BS(D), we denote by ΩT the set of allocations that are truncations to time T of an allocation
in Ω. This is also the corresponding set of initial allocations for the truncated economy. When we
consider the number N of agents as a parameter that can vary, we use the notations E∞(λ,ω;N),
E∞
T (λ,ω;N), and E(T,λ,ω;N) as well as Ω(N) and ΩT(N).
2.2 The Game
For any T, let GT be the game associated with the truncated economy E∞
T (λ,ω) of length T.I f
N is considered as a parameter that may vary, we will use the notation GT(N). At each node,
a Postlewaite & Schmeidler market game with ﬁat money determines the allocation of goods. In
addition, there are asset markets that link the periods.
92.2.1 Bids and Oﬀers
In order to trade goods, each agent places a bid bi
l(ξ) and an oﬀer qi
l(ξ) for good l at node ξ.T h e
bid is an amount of ﬁat money that is allocated to the purchase of that good, and the oﬀer is the
amount of that good that is put up for sale. The price is then the ratio of the total bid for a good










Similarly, to trade assets, each agent places a bid βi
j(ξ) a n da no ﬀer γi
j(ξ) for asset j at node ξ.
The bid is an amount of ﬁat money that is allocated to the purchase of that asset, and the oﬀer is









with the same convention as before that x/0=0 .




2.2.2 Allowable Strategies and Payoﬀs
Players may not sell more of a good than their endowment for that period. However, assets can
be sold short. Furthermore, there is a budget constraint on ﬁat money: the net product of selling
commodities added to the net product of assets traded and dividends paid at this node must be
nonnegative.




l(ξ) (for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ J, and
101 ≤ l ≤ L) are stated formally as follows. The set of actions available to agent i at node ξ,g i v e n
his holdings of assets from the predecessor node ξ−, is denoted Si(ξ). Note that we adopt the usual
convention that ϑi(ξ−












l(ξ) for all l ≤ L,
(b) 0 ≤ bi
l(ξ),βi
j(ξ),γi
j(ξ) for all l ≤ L and all j ≤ J,
(c) βi
j(ξ),γi
j(ξ)=0if ξ(j) > ξ}.



















Condition (∗i(ξ)) states that a budget constraint is satisﬁed for agent i at all nodes preceding
and including ξ. If one of these budget constraints is violated, then condition (∗i(ξ)) is violated and
the agent is removed from the economy for all nodes in D+(ξ). That is, all his goods and assets
are conﬁscated for those nodes.



























2.2.3 The Monitoring Structure
Each player can observe the price of goods and assets in each period in addition to his own asset
holdings. We use Hi(ξ) to denote the set of histories that could be observed by player i at node ξ.
For each ξ ≥ ξ0,
Hi(ξ)={(p(ξ0),π(ξ0),ϑi(ξ0−)) for all ξ0 < ξ} = R
(L+J)·τ(ξ−)
+ × RJ·τ(ξ−)
The set of histories available at the root of the tree is a singleton; that is, Hi(ξ0)={h0}. Thus a











σi(h) ∈ Si(ξ) for all ξ and all h ∈ Hi(ξ).
The game GT is deﬁned by the bid/oﬀer mechanism, allowable strategies, and monitoring
structure described in this Section 2.2.
3 Full Subgame-Perfect Equilibria: Generic Indeterminacy
In this section we prove that, generically in the endowment space, any sequentially strictly indi-
vidually rational and default-free11 payoﬀ vector can be approximated by a full subgame-perfect
11These terms will be made precise in the deﬁnitions that follow.
12equilibrium (SPE) of the T-period game just described if T is suﬃciently large and if players are
suﬃciently patient. Let us ﬁrst recall some basic deﬁnitions.

















are positive for all l,j,ξ. Moreover, a subgame-perfect equilibrium is considered full if it is supported
by a full strategy proﬁle.
Recall that an allocation is feasible if markets clear exactly at every node of the tree D.W e
now deﬁne default-free and sequentially strictly individually rational allocations. A default-free
allocation is one that can be implemented on D without any trader ever going bankrupt.
Deﬁnition 2 The set F of default-free allocations is the subset of allocations (xi(ξ))i∈I, ξ∈D ∈





i ωi(ξ) for every node ξ.
(ii) There exists a sequence of prices P =( ( pl(ξ))1≤l≤L,(πj(ξ))1≤j≤J)ξ∈D ∈ (RL+J
++ )n,a sw e l la s
a sequence of portfolio allocations ϑ =( ϑ
i
(ξ))i∈I, ξ∈D ∈ (RJnN







p(ξ) · xi + π(ξ) · ϑ
i








for each agent i and every node ξ.
Next we deﬁne an allocation to be sequentially strictly individually rational (“ssir” in the sequel)
if, for each period t, the expected ﬁnal utility of every player is strictly above the utility level induced
13by his initial endowments.
Deﬁnition 3 An allocation x is said to be sequentially strictly individually rational (ssir) up to





t) for all i and all t ≤ T∗.
We write FIR(T∗) for the subset of allocations that are default-free and sequentially strictly
individually rational up to time T∗.D e n o t eb yy(σ) the ﬁnal allocations resulting from the strategy
proﬁle σ, and let λ =m i n i λi. The next lemma provides suﬃcient conditions to ensure that FIR(T∗)
is nonempty.
Lemma 1 Consider E∞(λ,ω). If (ωi(ξ))i are Pareto-ineﬃcient in Eξ for all ξ,t h e nFIR(T) 6= ∅
for all terminal dates T.
We can now introduce our ﬁrst result. Suppose that, for any N, some stream of allocations
ω(N)=( ( ωi(ξ;N))1≤i≤N,ξ∈D ∈ BS(D)i sg i v e n .W ed e n o t eb yΩ(N) the set of feasible allocations





i ωi(ξ;N) for every node ξ}. The next deﬁnition introduces a property that will be
used in Theorem 1.
Deﬁnition 4 Given N players and a time horizon T,we say that an allocation x is an approximate
SPE of GT(N) if, for every ε∗ > 0, there is a discount factor λ0 such that: if λ ≥ λ0, then there is
af u l lS P Eσ of GT(N) such that
¯ ¯Ui(yi(σ)) − Ui(xi)
¯ ¯ < ε∗ for all i.
The following theorem says that, whatever the (ﬁnite) population size N, there exists a generic
choice of initial endowments such that every default-free and ssir allocation is an approximate SPE
of GT(N), provided the time horizon is long enough.
14Theorem 1 For any N, there exist an open and dense subset Ω∗(N) of the space Ω(N) and some
integer T0(N) such that, for every horizon T ≥ T0(N): if initial endowments ω belong to Ω∗
T(N),
then every x ∈FIR(T − T0(N)) is an approximate SPE of GT(N).
The proof is given in the appendix (Section 7). It makes use of two lemmata, which we state
here in order to give the reader an idea of what is going on. The ﬁrst lemma shows that, for any
T, allocations in FIR(T) can be attained with suitable strategies.
Lemma 2 Let x =( xi(ξ))i∈I,ξ∈D ∈FIR(T) . Then the following strategies result in this allocation.

























Here P =( ( pl(ξ))1≤l≤L,(πj(ξ))1≤j≤J)ξ∈D is a price system, θ is a vector of asset holdings such





j(ξ−), and δ > 0. These strategies are full.
The next lemma is due to Peck, Shell & Spear (1992) and is an adaptation of Corollary 5.19
(p. 298) of that paper. Consider, for each node ξ, the one-period economy Eξ i nw h i c ho n l ys p o t










.W ea l s ow r i t eGξ for the one-shot market game associated with
this economy, which is deﬁned by the same trading rules as before except that asset markets are
now closed. An interior action in this one-shot game is one for which all bids and oﬀers are strictly
15positive. Consequently, an interior Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (NE) with interior
actions. Note that a strategy proﬁle is full if it has interior actions at every node.
Lemma 3 (after Peck, Shell & Spear (1992)) Under our maintained assumptions, for each node ξ
there exists an open and dense subset Ω∗
ξ of initial allocations of the economy Eξ such that the set
of interior NE allocations of the one-shot game Gξ is a smooth submanifold of dimension L(N −1)
of the set of feasible allocations.
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of deﬁning a punishment strategy if a deviation is observed from
the “speciﬁed correct way to play” as well as a reward phase at the end of play. The equilibrium
path that is followed as long as nobody deviated achieves a given allocation that is default-free and
ssir; this is possible owing to Lemma 1. During the reward phase, one-shot Nash equilibria are
played of the game deﬁned by the spot consumption goods markets and considering the securities
markets closed. This is what introduces the approximation.
In order to provide incentives for players to punish deviators, the equilibrium plan prescribes to
shift from one sequence of rewarding Nash equilibria to another (strictly dominated) one in the event
that a player fails to punish. This requires ﬁnding a sequence of Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria of the
game deﬁned by the spot consumption goods markets and considering the securities markets closed.
However, we restrict ourselves to full subgame-perfect equilibria and so the securities markets are
never actually closed, because there is always a positive contribution to each side of each market.
Thus it must be checked, even in the reward phase, that no player would gain an advantage by
deviating multiple times in such a way as to capture and then use resources from the asset markets.
Remark 3.1. Theorem 1 provides, as a by-product, an existence proof for full subgame-perfect
equilibria in the presence of incomplete markets. Also, since it is easy to construct economies
with default-free and ssir allocations that are ﬁrst-best eﬃcient, Theorem 1 shows that imperfect
competition may overcome the (generic) second-best ineﬃciency of perfectly competitive equilibria.
16Finally, Theorem 1 gives an insight into the degree of indeterminacy of full SPE allocations.12 As
such, it echoes and reinforces results from Geanakoplos & Mas-Colell (1989). They show that, in a
smooth two-period economy with S states of nature, if the asset return matrix has full rank and if
N>Jthen there is a generic subset of initial endowments such that the manifold of competitive
equilibria is of dimension S − 1. This holds for any number of missing assets and for every ﬁnite
number of agents. Our result implies that the indeterminacy of the set of full subgame-perfect
equilibria is typically even larger, since FIR(T) has the same dimension as the space of feasible
allocations itself.
Remark 3.2 If we were to consider the same intertemporal game but with a continuum of
players, then Dubey & Kaneko’s (1984) “anti-Folk theorem” would imply that, as long as indi-
vidual deviations cannot be observed, players would play as if there were no monitoring. As a
consequence, our Theorem 1 would no longer hold.13 Thus, our paper suggests that there is a
discontinuity between the asymptotic strategic market game and its oceanic counterparts. More-
over, price manipulation seems to be necessary in order to outperform the (generically ineﬃcient)
competitive equilibria with incomplete markets.
Remark 3.3 T h er e a s o nw ea v o i d e da ni n ﬁnite-horizon setting is that the ﬁnite horizon allows
us to circumvent the problems raised by Ponzi schemes (see Magill & Quinzii (1994)). On the
other hand, we treat both the length of the horizon and the discount factor as parameters, thus
circumventing the usual counterintuitive backward phenomena.
12Notice that a partial converse inclusion can be easily shown: every full SPE must induce a feasible allocation.
Moreover, as this ﬁnal allocation is individually rational, it must also be default-free. However, it need not be ssir,
in general.
13See Kaneko (1982) for a ﬁrst statement of the anti-Folk theorem. See also Dubey & Kaneko (1985) for an
extension of the anti-Folk theorem to the case of ﬁnitely many players, where small deviations cannot be observed.
174A N o n c o n v e r g e n c e R e s u l t
Postlewaite & Schmeidler (1978) show that: if the number of traders is large enough, and if the
aggregate endowment is large enough relative to the number of traders, and if each individual
trader’s endowment is small enough, then any full NE is η-eﬃcient.
In this section, we deduce a nonconvergence result from Theorem 1. We show that, for a large
open set of initial endowments that does not contain the closure of the subset of η-eﬃcient allo-
cations, Postlewaite and Schmeidler’s convergence result cannot be extended to our intertemporal
setup. To set the stage, we now recall deﬁnitions and the approximate eﬃciency theorem from
Postlewaite & Schmeidler (1978).14
Deﬁnition 5 For η > 0, a feasible allocation x is η-eﬃcient if there does not exist any allocation
(a) that Pareto-dominates x and is feasible in any ﬁctitious economy with the same utility functions
as the original ones and (b) in which the aggregate initial endowment vector is at most (1−η)
P
i ωi,
where ωi are the initial allocations in the original economy.
Note that the set of η-eﬃcient allocations is an open subset of the feasible set. For the sake of
completeness, we now recall the classical result obtained by Postlewaite & Schmeidler (1978) for a
one-period economy.
Approximate Eﬃciency Theorem (Postlewaite & Schmeidler (1978)) For any positive numbers
α,β,η, any allocation resulting from a full NE in an economy (ωi,u i)1≤i≤N is η-eﬃcient, where
ωi < β · (1,...,1) for all i =1 ,...,N,
P
i ωi >N· α · (1,...,1), and N>16Lβ/αη2.
I nt h en e x tt h e o r e m ,w es h o wt w ot h i n g s .F i r s t ,w em a k et h ee a s yo b s e r v a t i o nt h a t ,i fi n i t i a l
allocations are η-eﬃcient, then FIR(T) is included in the set of η-eﬃcient allocations, which we
14It is worth noting that the deﬁnition of feasibility used by Postlewaite & Schmeidler (1978) requires only that
demand not exceed supply, whereas we require that markets clear.
18denote Γη. Second, if initial allocations are not in the closure Γη of the set of η-eﬃcient allocations,
then there is an open set of allocations that are in FIR(T) and that are not η-eﬃcient.
Theorem 2 For any population size N, t h e r ee x i s t sa no p e na n dd e n s es u b s e tΩη(N) of the space
Ω(N) with the following property. For any horizon T:
• if ω ∈ Ω
η
T(N) ∩ Γη then FIR(T) ⊆ Γη;a n d
• if ω ∈ Ω
η
T(N)\Γη then FIR(T)\Γη contains a full-dimensional nonempty open subset.
Corollary 1 If the horizon is suﬃciently long and players are suﬃciently patient, then there is
a full-dimensional subset of feasible allocations that can be approximated by full subgame-perfect
equilibria and that are not in the closure of the set of η-eﬃcient allocations. Hence Postlewaite and
Schmeidler’s approximate convergence theorem cannot be extended to our setup.
This follows from Theorem 1 and the second part of Theorem 2 after observing that FIR(T) ⊂
FIR(T − T0(N)).
Remark 4.1. Our preceding results are “only” generic, and there are two reasons for that.
The most obvious one is that we need the set of one-shot NE allocations of the stage-games of
the last R periods to be full-dimensional. In some sense, this is the analogue, in our general
equilibrium framework, of the full-dimensionality requirement that was found by Benoit & Krishna
(1985) to be a necessary condition for anything akin to a perfect Folk theorem to hold in ﬁnitely
repeated games. But there is a second reason: when the number N of agents grows, we need to
consider economies with new, additional initial endowments. It is perfectly possible — even though
we started with an economy whose initial endowments were ineﬃcient — that adding new agents
makes the resulting initial allocations Pareto-optimal (or, at least, η-eﬃcient).15 Clearly, however,
15To see this, think of an economy with a large number of traders and a Pareto-optimal allocation that does not
belong to the core. This economy may be viewed as being obtained from a smaller one that is made of a subgroup
of agents whose initial endowments were not eﬃcient.
19the problem disappears if one slightly perturbs the new initial endowments that have just been
added. This is where the generic choice of initial endowments enters the picture for the second
time.
5 Strategic Speculative Bubbles
In a ﬁnite-horizon, perfectly competitive, stochastic GEI economy, if a security ceases to yield any
dividend then its equilibrium price is zero, because its capital value is exclusively attributable to
its dividend stream. Here it is easy to see, given Theorem 2, that a security can have a positive
price even if it yields no dividend.
Consider an economy of any length with any number of players. As neither of these will vary
in this section, we drop the corresponding notation. Now consider a security j that yields a zero
dividend in any period. Suppose that players coordinate on an equilibrium path where each trader
















Hence this asset has a nonzero price along the equilibrium path even though there will be no net
20trade of it. Moreover, the trading of this asset does not aﬀect the budget constraint.
Therefore, given any SPE allocation x∗ of any game deﬁned without security j, one can add the
dummy asset j and complete the equilibrium strategies accordingly. By virtue of Theorem 2, x∗ is
still an SPE allocation of the modiﬁed game that includes security j. The capital value of j along
such a subgame-perfect path can only arise from a (strategic) speculative bubble on the security.
As a consequence, the linear pricing rule (or, equivalently, the no-arbitrage opportunity as-
sumption, or still equivalently the martingale property of prices) does not necessarily hold at a
full SPE of our ﬁnancial trading game, even though the (ﬁnite) number of agents may be cho-
sen to be arbitrarily large. This may seem reminiscent of the ﬁndings by Koutsougeras (2000).
There is, however, a sharp distinction between his result and ours: Koutsougeras (2000) builds
one particular example of a static game, where identical objects of trade can be given diﬀerent
prices at equilibrium. Moreover, in his model the apparent arbitrage opportunity disappears as the
number of agents tends to inﬁnity. What we have just shown is that, for every economy, there is
a generic choice of endowments such that there exist full subgame-perfect equilibria that exhibit
arbitrage opportunities, provided the horizon of the economy is suﬃciently large and its traders are
suﬃciently patient. And these arbitrage opportunities do not vanish as the population becomes
large.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Perhaps the most important implication of the present work is that it leads to reconsidering the
eﬃciency of the “invisible hand” for intertemporal economies. Indeed, we show in this paper that
the eﬀect of price manipulation may be much diﬀerent in a dynamic setting than in a static one. In
particular, the convergence of strategic equilibria toward (almost) eﬃcient allocations — as players’
inﬂuence on prices becomes negligible — fails when truly dynamic behavior is taken into account
21(when markets are incomplete, this may be fortunate!). This remark prompts ﬁve issues.
1. It sheds new light on questions that were recently reactivated by Levine & Zame (1999). They
consider a model with a single consumption good and no aggregate risk in which the incompleteness
of markets is circumvented by intertemporal consumption smoothing. As the traders’ lives tend to
inﬁnity and the traders become inﬁnitely patient, every competitive allocation converges to perfect
risk sharing with constant average consumption. Our indeterminacy results suggest that the positive
result of Levine and Zame rests on vulnerable grounds. Indeed, when the general equilibrium model
with perfect competition is viewed as a shortcut for the limit of a strategic market game, then such
conclusions can not always be drawn. Indeed, in such a game, associated to a generic economy
there always exist full subgame-perfect equilibria that remain far from perfect risk sharing.
More generally, the main argument (in the macroeconomic literature) in favor of the “permanent
income hypothesis” is that, when investors are patient, they can borrow in bad times and save in
good ones. This argument fails in our framework because such behavior may be prohibited along
the equilibrium path. Indeed, since players are nonnegligible, they can aﬀect prices by smoothing
their consumption stream. Because prices are observed, this individual impact will be noticed and
may induce retaliation. Hence it may happen that no player wishes to smoothen his consumption
across time, however patient he may be, for fear of being punished.
2. Our results put into question the shortcut described in Chapter 7 of Debreu’s (1959) Theory of
Value, according to which a complete set of contingent markets open at time 0 would be enough, in
theory, to enable investors to make optimal decisions in an intertemporal economy. For this shortcut
to work, two related things are required. One is the equivalence between a market structure with
a complete set of contingent markets (on the one hand) and a market structure with spot markets
and intertemporal trades through a complete set of securities (on the other). The second is the
implicit assumption of competitive equilibrium theory that, in the intertemporal model, players
22do not reconsider — as time passes — the decisions they made at the beginning of time. These
two requirements are satisﬁed when markets are competitive or if players cannot observe market
behavior as time passes. If, on the contrary, players can observe the (spot and ﬁnancial) market
behavior and have the opportunity to revise their strategies accordingly, as they do in this paper,
then the equivalence between contingent markets and ﬁnancial ones fails even when markets are
complete. This nonequivalence echoes the result already obtained in Weyers (1999) for two-period
economies. There, it was proven that a complete set of contingent claims does not yield the same
set of Nash equilibria as the outcomes induced by a complete set of ﬁnancial securities. Here, the
property that market structure matters in strategic games is extended to the more general setting
of intertemporal incomplete markets.
3. We have shown that, when markets are incomplete, imperfect competition may perform
better than perfectly competitive markets. Unfortunately, however, we do not prove that it must
do so. Indeed, there are many subgame-perfect equilibria of the suﬃciently long game that are not
(constrained) eﬃcient, and these may be Pareto-dominated by perfectly competitive equilibria. The
second open question, then, is whether it is possible to restrict the set of subgame-perfect equilibria
to those that yield second-best outcomes. This question is addressed, and answered positively, in
Giraud & Stahn (2001) but for a diﬀerent mechanism than the one used in this paper, a diﬀerent
strategic solution concept, and only for two-period economies.
4. We make one proviso: as already stated, what drives the results obtained in this paper is that,
given a certain number of agents or types, we ﬁrst take a suﬃciently large horizon and then let the
number of agents or types increase. At ﬁrst glance, it seems that reversing the order of both limits
should drastically change the results. Indeed, a basic step of our argument is the indeterminacy
of static Nash equilibria, which enables us to construct reward and punishment strategies in the
last periods of play. As a consequence, taking ﬁrst a given horizon length and a suﬃciently large
23population — and only then letting the horizon length increase — might change the qualitative results
obtained in this paper. This inquiry is left for further research.
5. One main restriction of the present work is that we only consider purely ﬁnancial assets,
primarily because this enables us to build on Postlewaite & Schmeidler’s (1978) strategic market
game with ﬁat money. Indeed, this latter speciﬁcation has the advantage that the convergence
of strategic equilibria toward η-eﬃcient allocations obtains much more easily than with Shapley
& Shubik’s (1977) formulation, where an additional condition in terms of numéraire liquidity is
needed. This provides an additional strength to our negative result: in this paper, the failure of
convergence cannot be attributed to some lack of liquidity. On the other hand, an extension of our
results to the setting of real assets would not be problematic, provided that those securities are still
traded within a strategic framework with ﬁat money.
However, what is problematic — and this may look paradoxical at ﬁrst glance — is the treatment
of the following apparently simpler case. Suppose that traders face a ﬁnite-horizon economy with
no uncertainty, trade within a numéraire framework àl aShapley & Shubik (1977) or Dubey &
Shubik (1978), and simply transfer wealth across periods thanks to the (storable) numéraire. In
this situation, it is not clear how to deﬁne a reward phase at the end of every play. In fact,
precluding backward induction phenomena would require players to play some interior SPE for a
number of periods, which would serve as reward periods, at the end of the game. The diﬃculty is
that, even for two-period games, the existence of an SPE with nontrivial monitoring in a strategic
market game is an open question. We leave this, together with the extension of the present work
to the numéraire framework, for further research.
247A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a 1 .Fix T. For any ξ =( σ,t) such that t ≤ T, there exists a vector (xi(ξ))i,w h i c h
is feasible in Eξ and Pareto-dominates ω(ξ)=( ωi(ξ))i. By the strict monotonicity of preferences,




Because of this and because the utility functions are strictly increasing, there exists a hyperplane
containing y(ξ) and ω(ξ) that deﬁnes a strictly positive price vector (pl(ξ))l∈L. Hence y := (y(ξ))ξ∈D




t) for all i and
all t. Thus y ∈FIR(T). ¤

































i ωi(ξ) (by feasibility of x),
we have rl(ξ)=pl(ξ). It follows immediately that xi
l(ξ)=xi
l(ξ) for all l.
Moreover, ϑi





































































j(ξ)/πj(ξ), and the following
statements hold.
• If ∆i
















































































w h i c h( a sc a nb es e e nf r o mD e ﬁnition 2) is equal to 0. Because x is sequentially strictly individually
rational up to period T and given our maintained boundary condition on individual preferences, it
easily follows that these strategies are full. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the economy E∞(λ,ω;N). For any ξ, consider the spot commodity
Postlewaite—Schmeidler game Gξ(N) associated with the economy Eξ(N). Lemma 3 shows that, at
any node ξ =( t,σ), there exists a generic choice Ω∗
ξ(N) ⊂ Ωξ(N) of initial allocations such that
there is a nonempty full-dimensional ball of interior Nash equilibria of Gξ(N) in the interior of the
set of feasible allocations.








i ωi(ξ). Moreover, such an
equilibrium necessarily induces binding budget constraints (∗i(ξ));h e n c e(3.1) is satisﬁed and the
corresponding ﬁnal allocation is default-free.
Let Ω∗(N)=
©
ω ∈ Ω(N):ωξ ∈ Ω∗
ξ(N) for all ξ
ª
and assume from now on that ω ∈ Ω∗(N). For




++ : ωξ ∈ Ω∗
ξ(N) for all ξ =( t,σ) such that t ≤ T
ª
.N o t et h a tΩ∗(N)
is open and dense in Ω(N) and that Ω∗
T(N) is open and dense in ΩT(N).
We now show that one can pick a sequence of N(T − 1) Pareto-ranked NE outcomes of Gξ(N)
at any ξ =( t,σ). First observe that, by Lemma 3, for every interior Nash equilibrium allocation
x of Gξ there exists, for η > 0 suﬃciently small, an open ball B(x,η) ⊆ RL(N−1)of radius η such
that each element y ∈ B(x,η) is also an interior Nash equilibrium allocation of Gξ.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
there exists an interior NE allocation x(ξ,N)=( xi(ξ,N))i that strictly Pareto-dominates the spot
27initial allocations (ωi(ξ))i. Under our smoothness assumptions on the utility functions ui
t(·) of
each player i, the subset of feasible allocations that (weakly) Pareto-dominate x(ξ,N) is a convex,
closed subset of R
L(N−1)
++ that admits x(ξ,N) in its boundary. Hence there exists a NE allocation
x2(ξ,N)=( xi
2(ξ,N))i in a neighborhood of x(ξ,N) that is strictly Pareto-dominated by x(ξ,N).
By iterating the same argument recursively, we can construct a collection (xn(ξ,N))
N(T−1)
n=1 of
N(T − 1) strictly Pareto-ranked interior NE allocations of Gξ(N) with x1(ξ,N)=x(ξ,N).L e tN
be ﬁxed for the moment.
Denote by bi
l(ξ,N;n) and qi
l(ξ,N;n) the bid and oﬀer (respectively) of agent i in commodity l







n+1(ξ,N)) for all i,n,ξ =( t,σ) such that t ≤ τ.
Let εn(N)=m i n i≤N,ξ:t≤τ εi
n(ξ,N) and ε(N)=m i n n εn(N). There is no loss of generality in assum-
ing that the restriction of ui
t(·) to the set of default-free allocations of spot commodities of Eξ(N)
is uniformly bounded by αi
t ∈ R+. Let αi =m a x 1≤t≤τ αi
t and α(N)=m a x i≤N αi. Now let T0(N)
be the smallest integer larger than α(N)/ε(N), that is, T0(N)=bα(N)/ε(N)+1 c. Consider only
T ≥ T0(N). Moreover, given T, consider only R such that α(N)/ε(N) <R≤ T.
Let players play the following strategies in order to approximate the allocation x =( x(ξ))ξ∈D ∈
FIR(T −T0(N)). For the ﬁrst T −R periods, use Lemma 2 to construct full strategies that exactly
achieve (x(ξ))ξ:t≤(T−R). Note that this is actually possible for all x ∈FIR(T −R), which is a larger
set than FIR(T −T0(N)). The statement of the theorem is thus more restricted than necessary, in
the interest of clarity of exposition.
If everyone has played the prescribed strategies during the ﬁrst T − R periods then it follows
that, for all ξ =( t,σ) with t>T−R, traders play some full NE actions on the spot goods markets







Denote these actions by αδ(N). Note that with these actions, the price of each asset is equal to 1
and hence the net trade of each asset is 0 for each player.
If, on the other hand, anyone has deviated before period T − R, then the punishment is for
everyone — until period T − R (included) — to play αδ(N) on each asset market and aδ(N) on the







Furthermore, they all play x2(ξ,N) on the goods markets and αδ(N) on the asset markets for all
ξ =( t,σ) such that t>T− R. With these actions, the price of each good and each asset is equal
to 1 and the net trade is 0 in each good and each asset for each trader.
Likewise, if at any time t>T− R an u m b e rn of deviations has been observed prior to that
time, including deviations from the punishment that should be in play, then the further punishment
is to play xn+1(ξ,N) (instead of xn(ξ,N)) on the goods markets and αδ(N) on the asset markets
for all ξ =( t0,σ) such that t0 ≥ t. Hence all players lose at least εn(N) > 0 in utility for each period
subsequent to the nth deviation and as a result of this nth deviation.
We want to show that this allows us to ε∗-approximate the default-free and sequentially strictly
individually rational stream of allocations x by a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE), if the game’s
time horizon is long enough.
29First observe that
¯ ¯Ui(yi(σ)) − Ui(xi)













=2 αi(λi)T−R(1 − (λi)R).
This can be made less than or equal to ε∗ for any i by taking λi suﬃciently close to 1 for any values
of N, T, R, and αi. Thus, for any ε∗ > 0 and given T and αi, there is a λ1(R,N) such that, if
λ ≥ λ1(R,N),t h e n
¯ ¯Ui(yi(σ)) − Ui(xi)
¯ ¯ < ε∗,i =1 ,...,N.
Now we must check that these full strategies deﬁne an SPE. Let us begin by checking that
nobody has any interest in deviating from the prescribed actions during any period t ≥ T − R,n o
matter what happened before. That the Nash equilibria we are considering are full will force us to
consider the possibility that some players would want to deviate in the last R periods of the game.
Indeed, the prescribed strategies have agents play almost no-trade on the asset markets as well
as a NE of the spot commodities market game in each of the last R periods. Given the total amount
δ of bids and oﬀers put on each trading post for ﬁnancial securities, it is possible that a player
would have a proﬁtable deviation in one of those periods by trading on the asset markets in order
to get more ﬁat money, which will enable him to buy more goods today, or in order to get more
assets that will generate more dividends with which to buy more goods later.
Suppose that player i deviates at node ξ =( t,σ) and that his is the nth observed deviation.
There is an amount δ of each asset put up for sale and an amount δ of money bid for each asset.
Thus, a unilateral deviation of player i in node ξ enables him to grasp at most δ units of each
30ﬁnancial asset and Jδ units of ﬁat money.
There are many ways for the deviating player to spend the beneﬁts of his deviation. He could
spend the money, Jδ, right away. He could also spend the dividends later. In terms of dividends,
the maximum amount would result from δ units of each security in each of the last R periods. The







Let κ = J + R
P
j maxξ:t>T−R V j(ξ), so that an absolute upper bound on what a deviating player
could spend is given by considering that he receives δκ in each of the last R periods. Note that κ
does not depend on δ.
The maximal additional quantity of commodity l that player i c a no b t a i nb yp e r f o r m i n gt h e
nth deviation at node ξ i sd e r i v e db yc a l c u l a t i n gt h ed i ﬀerence between what he buys along the
























l (ξ,N;n),B l(ξ,N;n): =B−i
l (ξ,N;n)+bi
l(ξ,N;n),a n dQl(ξ,N;n): =
P
h qh
l (ξ,N;n).H e n c e , i f p l a y e r i performs the nth deviation at node ξ then he can capture at
most νi










31Thus, player i gains at most ηi
n(ξ,N,δ) at node ξ and loses εi
n(ξ0) at each successor node ξ0 ≥ ξ.





and recall that εn(N)=m i n i≤N,ξ:t≤τ εi
n(ξ,N) and ε(N)=m i n n εn(N).
Now, in order to derive a certainly overstated upper bound on the beneﬁts of deviating, we
calculate the maximum beneﬁt the deviating player could gain if he were to bid the maximum
possible amount of money on every commodity and in every period. Thus the actual beneﬁt di
that player i gets from deviating is less than
PT
s=t(λi)s−1η(N,δ). His loss li from deviating in period
t is felt every period after period t,a n dli ≥ ε(N)(
PT
s=t+1(λi)s−1).
By continuity of each stage-utility function, and since the νi
l(ξ,N,δ;n) are increasing in δ,t h e r e












δ0(N)= m i n
T−R≤t≤T
δ0(N,t).
When δ is smaller than δ0(N), this form of deviation cannot be proﬁtable for any player at any
period t after T − R.
The ﬁnite collection of N(T − 1) Pareto-ranked interior NE allocations associated with each
node ξ is suﬃcient for the preceding punishment strategy to have real bite (i.e., to dissuade any
player from deviating from the equilibrium path). Indeed, at any nonterminal node of the tree,
at most N(T − 2) deviations have already occurred. This completes the proof of the fact that no
32player will wish to deviate during any of the last R periods.16
Suppose now that player i is considering a deviation in a period t ≤ T − R. From periods t
until T − R included, the maximum amount of spot commodity available will be δ.W e a l r e a d y
know from previous reasoning that no player will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate after period T − R
no matter how many deviations have already occurred. Therefore, the maximum possible gain for
player i is given by













where ξ i st h en o d ea tw h i c hp l a y e ri deviated in period t and 1 is the unit vector of length L. On
the other hand, the minimal loss to player i from performing the nth deviation is




By continuity of the utility functions we have, for δ small enough (say, δ ≤ δ1(N)), that di ≤
(1 − λ)λt−iαi. Moreover, hi ≥ ε(N)R(1 − λi)(λi)T.
Thus, if di ≤ (1−λi)(λi)t−1αi < ε(N)R(1−λi)(λi)T ≤ hi, then player i will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to deviate:
(1 − λi)(λi)t−1αi < εiR(1 − λi)(λi)T
⇐⇒ (λi)t−1αi < εiR(λi)T




The right-hand side of the last inequality must be less than 1 in order to make sense, but this is
imposed by our assumption on R.
16Recall that we require (without loss of generality) that there be no assets to be traded in the last period.
33Therefore, for any T we can ﬁnd R and λ2(R,N) such that (λ2(R,N))T > α(N)/ε(N)R.
If λ ≥ λ2(R,N), then hi ≥ di for all i and no player ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate in any period
t ≤ T−R. Hence the proposed full strategy proﬁle is subgame-perfect. Recall that α(N)/ε(N)R<1
by assumption on R and let λ0(R,N,ε∗)=m a x {λ1(R,N,ε∗),λ2(R,N)}. Now, for any ε∗,i fλ
≥ λ0(R,N,ε∗) then the proposed strategy proﬁle is a full SPE that ε∗-approximates x.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove the ﬁrst part, suppose that ω is η-eﬃcient. Take x ∈FIR(T). If




zi ≤ (1 − η)
X
i




As x is ssir, it follows that Ui(xi) >U i(ωi). Hence Ui(zi) >U i(ωi) and
P
i zi ≤ (1 − η)
P
i ωi,
which contradicts the fact that ω is η-eﬃcient.
To prove the second part of the theorem, let Ωη(N) be the subset of Ω∗(N) (as deﬁned in the
proof of Theorem 1) that contains only initial allocations that are Pareto-ineﬃcient at every node.
Thus Ωη(N) is open and dense in Ω(N).
Take y =( yi)i that strictly Pareto-dominates ω, as in the proof of Lemma 1, and let yk :=
1
ky + k−1
k ω. It is easily seen that
yk ∈ FIR(T) for all k and yk → ω.
Because ω / ∈ Γη, there exists a k0 such that, for every k>k 0,y k / ∈ Γη.
Because preferences are strictly concave, ui
t(yi
k(ξ)) >u i
t(ωi(ξ)). Hence, for all ξ, yk(ξ) is in the















Preferences are strictly monotonic, so for every feasible allocation m(ξ) belonging to some neigh-
borhood of yk(ξ) there is a hyperplane through m(ξ) and ω(ξ) whose orthogonal direction deﬁnes




ξ∈D B(yk(ξ),ν(ξ)). Then n is ssir and default-free for all n ∈ B.T h u sB ⊆FIR(T)
and is full-dimensional. For maxξ ν(ξ) suﬃciently small, B ∩ Γη = ∅. ¤
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